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Abstract: This paper considers how to achieve equitable water governance and the flow-on effects it
has in terms of supporting sustainable development, drawing on case studies from the international
climate change adaptation and governance project (CADWAGO). Water governance, like many
other global issues, is becoming increasingly intractable (wicked) with climate change and is, by the
international community, being linked to instances of threats to human security, the war in the Sudanese
Darfur and more recently the acts of terrorism perpetuated by ISIS. In this paper, we ask the question:
how can situations characterized by water controversy (exacerbated by the uncertainties posed by
climate change) be reconciled? The main argument is based on a critique of the way the water security
discourse appropriates expert (normal) claims about human-biophysical relationships. When water
challenges become increasingly securitized by the climate change discourse it becomes permissible
to enact processes that legitimately transgress normative positions through post-normal actions.
In contrast, the water equity discourse offers an alternative reading of wicked and post-normal water
governance situations. We contend that by infusing norm critical considerations into the process of
securitization, new sub-national constellations of agents will be empowered to enact changes; thereby
bypassing vicious cycles of power brokering that characterize contemporary processes intended to
address controversies.
Keywords: water equity; water conflict; securitization; climate change; governance; wicked problems
1. Introduction: The Advent of the Water Security Narrative
Economic disparities and deeply entrenched post-colonial power differentials have effectively
sheltered the global North from the impact of so-called global challenges. However, this situation
dramatically changed midway through 2015, when Europeans experienced two significant global
challenges first-hand: mass migration and terrorism. The atrocities and violent conflict perpetuated by
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) within the larger Tigris and Euphrates basin, has displaced
millions of people. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have made their way to Europe, only to be
met by great reticence. Most EU member states are abandoning deeply held societal values and a
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so called European identity, founded on solidarity and equity, by closing their borders under the
pretext that they are safeguarding the welfare of the State. In countries with more open-door policies,
such as Sweden, the public sector is being crippled under the weight of guaranteeing the welfare of the
massive influx of newcomers. The interconnected, tragic acts of terrorism, such as in Paris in November
2015, brought international terrorism to Europe’s doorstep. As a response, this has unleashed an
unprecedented process of reforms that are curbing civil liberties and transparency, legitimized under
the pretext of safeguarding national security.
Climate change has loomed as another challenge taking center stage in global discourse in the
latter part of 2015. During the last decade, the debate on climate change has ramped up, coinciding with
increasing consensus within the scientific community that climate change is real and predominantly
driven by humans [1]. In order to awaken the political domain to the threats posed by climate change,
several narratives have been crafted such as the Anthropocene: an earth system that has flipped from
a regime governed by natural drivers to one governed by human agency [2]. Along similar lines,
Rockström et al. speak of Planetary Boundaries; a narrative founded on the claim that humans have
transgressed a set of natural boundaries in terms of historical green-house gas emissions and exited
out of the “safe operating space for humanity” [3].
These narratives from science have, however, generally failed to gain political traction, mostly
on account of the controversy in reconciling geo-centered planetary stability, as advocated by the
climate scientists, with the development agenda of discrete nation states and/or economic interests of
large multi-nationals. Moreover, the climate discourse is characterized by sharp power differentials;
whereby many of the proposed actions to mitigate climate change incur the greatest costs on the global
South and development agendas designed to address poverty alleviation and human well-being [4].
The presence of these multilayered inequities has constrained processes designed to secure a universal
agreement to combat climate change, instanced by a series of failed United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) meetings.
In the latter part of 2015, as Europeans and the global community struggled to make sense of
mass migration and terrorism, climate change was evoked as a “convenient truth” to fill the void
created by the tumultuous European Autumn: An insecure world, characterized by terrorism and
mass migration, driven by climate change. This repackaged narrative was no longer communicated as
a future warning but rather as a contemporaneous state of emergency, a systemically interconnected
trilogy of self-reinforcing global challenges, affecting the development agendas of the global North
and South. In all likelihood, it was the recasting of climate change mitigation as an act to safeguard
human security that helped push COP 21, the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, over the finishing line,
bringing about political consensus; a universal agreement between 196 nations to curb global warming
at 1.5 ◦C above pre-industrial levels. COP 21 became the peace summit that author and journalist
Naomi Klein [5] said she had hoped for only two weeks earlier when interviewed by Fredrik Skavlan
during a Swedish talk show. Yet, while COP 21 was heralded as a major break-through and offered
some limited wins for stakeholders in the global South, it did not radically shift the unequal terrain or
relinquish authority from main power-holders such as the US, China, EU and India [6].
2. The Water Securitization Discourse
Underpinning the climate change discourse, as it came to fruition during and post COP 21,
are neo-Malthusian assumptions that increased scarcity of resources will exacerbate insecurity and
inevitably propel society towards violent conflict [7]. In this regard, the impact on the water cycle is
considered particularly significant. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projections
suggest the impact on water resources will manifest as sea level rise, shifts in weather patterns with an
increase in the occurrence of extreme weather events and increased water stress [8,9].
Following this reasoning, climate change will not only exacerbate water scarcity but also impact
upon human and material resources that have a systemic interconnection with water. Thus, we see
the neo-Malthusian storyline gaining strength when it mingles with the larger concerns linked to
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water, by claiming that amplified scarcities will increase the likelihood of conflict. This phenomenon
is also referred to as a “threat multiplier” [10]. A turning point in the securitization of global climate
change was in 2007 when the IPCC released its fourth annual report calling for “extraordinary policy
responses” [8].
One way to view such responses is as “post normal”, i.e., actions that overstep the normative
boundary set by accepted rules and regulation, such as international environmental conventions
or human rights law. Post normal situations are generally referred to as situations in which “facts
are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” [11]. Under such conditions
traditional approaches, shaped by pre-existing norms and structures to bring about change have
proven dysfunctional.
Simultaneously with the IPCC developments, three EU countries included climate change as a
security threat on their international agenda, the UK introduced climate change as a topic of the UN
Security Council and climate change featured in the G-8 meeting agenda. In this regard, the much-cited
Darfur conflict has been used as an example of the interconnection between climate change and violent
conflict. This situation has been reported as the first modern climate change conflict, growing out of
famine and displacement; a claim that the international community has widely embraced [12]. More
recently and as noted earlier, the international community now, in part, also attributes the violent
conflict arising from the actions of ISIS within the larger Tigris and Euphrates basin to climate change.
Among others, Box and Klein [13] have articulated such links between climate change, water and the
rise of ISIS (18:2015) (Box 1).
Box 1. Climate change, water and the rise of ISIS.
Box 1. Box and Klein maintain that the link is now uncontroversial, arguing that even the former U.S. state
secretary, John Kerry is making the claim; suggesting that Syria’s worst drought on record occurred just before
Syrian Civil war; a drought leading to migration of 1.5 million Syrian farmers and thus intensifying political
unrest. Box and Klein also argue that Iraq was invaded because of its oil wealth, oil that is driving the carbon
emitting economic system. On a concluding note in the New Yorker, Box and Klein write that “ISIS found fertile
ground in this volatile context of too much oil and too little water”.
Freshwater is considered to have the greatest conflict potential, lending weight to the view that
river basins are particularly prone to so-called “water wars”. Most of the cited studies are from the
Middle East and are situated within regions such as Jordan, Indus and Euphrates basins, which have a
long history of insecurity [14–16]. In a report prepared by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD) it is argued that the number one climate change security threat comprises of
increased competition for scarce water resources, which will complicate peace agreements [17].
Cited studies suggest that there is overwhelming incidence of conflict resolution occurring at
transnational level, mostly linked to transboundary waters [9,18–20]. Drawing on such reasoning,
Wolf et al. [21] mapped basins with the potential for political stresses or conflicting interests in the
coming 5–10 years. The cited basins include, the Kunene, Okavango, Orange, Limpopo and Incomati
in southern Africa; Lake Chad and the Sengal in west Africa; The Ganges, Brahmaphutra and Meghna
in South Asia; The Mekong and Saleen in southeast Asia and the Ob in central Asia. It is now
14 years after this study was conducted and no violent conflict has occurred in those basins (pers.
com. Ashok Swain, 2015). Swain (2015) reiterates that the only transboundary violent conflict that
has occurred in a basin is in Euphrates-Tigris. This is a relatively new conflict and precipitated by
the havoc wreaked by ISIS. The water security discourse principally maintains its reified storylines
at transnational level—by default legitimizing those country representatives participating in the
negotiations that already tend to be the dominant power-holders (e.g., armed groups, political units
and nation states). Yet, the overwhelming incidence of violent conflict occurs at subnational level,
with a marked increase in civil war [22,23].
What we have been witnessing in the water and climate change discourse is a pathway to
securitization, i.e., the transformation of an issue through a process of scientification, politicization
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and extreme politicization (securitization). Securitization here refers to “active processes of
invoking security and setting in motion policies and actions on the basis of presenting matters
as threatening” [24]. According to the so-called Copenhagen School, a school of thought with its
roots in international relations, an issue becomes securitized when the enactment of “extraordinary”
(emergency) actions by states are motivated; actions that can legitimately transgress existing rules and
norms for the sake of security [25].
As we have observed in the case of concerns with water resource in the context of impending
climatic change, once the issue is transposed into this post-normal positioning, the need for rigorous
scientific evidence to support a claim becomes less important. It casts the spotlight away from “objective”
threats or threats that are experienced first-hand in the problem context. This, in turn, redirects attention
to the political domain where protection of the values and interests of nation states and other power
holders becomes the primary focus [25].
Thus, proponents of the Copenhagen school with their distinctive state centered ontology, at least
prior to the Paris COP, considered that global warming had not been successfully securitized; owing to
the absence of a collective agreement that legitimized the enactment of extraordinary measures.
Indeed, even now with the Paris agreement in place, Bo [26] concludes, drawing on the securitization
theory deployed by the Copenhagen school suggests, that in spite of the divergent views between
China and EU, the conditions for the international securitization of climate change have not been
met. Reflecting further on the Copenhagen’s school ontological boundary conditions and in particular
what Julia Trombetta [27] refers to as the “logic of war”, the indirect and non-intentional threats to
human security invoked by environmental threats are diminutive in comparison to the unambiguity
of violent conflict.
In contrast to the Copenhagen School’s claim that climate change is a weaker form of
de-territorialized securitization, a diverse group of scholars have applied a broader “sociological”
framework to examine what Michael Mason [28] refers to as diverse performative spaces of both
state and non-state actors. Mason applies these two strands of securitization theory to understand
how state and non-state actors have portrayed climate change as a threat multiplier in terms of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and thereby the larger middle east, particularly in terms of projected water
scarcities. His examination reveals how power-holders have exploited the discursive openings within
a larger process of climate change securitization to legitimize the enactment of extraordinary or post
normal climate change actions: Palestine, he argues, intent on achieving statehood, has aligned itself
to the international communities’ discourse, of “climate change as a threat multiplier” to common
sub-artesian water resources in order to motivate its extraordinary action against Israel’s occupation.
Israel on the other hand, intent on re-territorializing, articulates the issue as a “domestic” concern
and applies an expert scientific narrative as grounds for implementing the response: a discriminatory
territorial water sharing regime.
Cognizant of the above, this paper considers how the inequities that are often associated with
actions directed at climate change and water governance can be reconciled.
3. Safeguarding Equity in Times of Post Normal Climate Actions
Insights from a recently concluded European and Global Challenges research project, Climate
Adaptation and Water Governance (CADWAGO), suggest that many actions designed to mitigate
and adapt to climate change thus far have led to serious conflicts of interest and the reproduction
of societal inequities [29–31]. Drawing together these lessons offers an alternative reading of how
to approach wicked and post-normal water management situations. In contrast to the mainstream
security discourse outlined above, this equity based narrative articulates a way to attend not only to
the material and/or biophysical stakes on which basis stake-holders make their claims but to who
actually should have agency in the enactment of governance.
The CADWAGO project was specifically conceived to support governance transformations that
address the intractable hazards and risks underpinning water security. In its original conceptualization,
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the project viewed intractable hazards and risks to be both overdetermined and irreducibly uncertain.
Overdetermined problems are differentiated from “normal” risks where an explanatory relationship
can be established between cause and effect. In contrast, over-determined problems are defined by
non-linear relationships in which causes are causative but not explanatory [32]. Irreducible uncertainty
arises when there are contested versions of the “public good(s)” derived from water. Under such
conditions prescriptive approaches, shaped by pre-existing norms and institutional structures to bring
about change have proven dysfunctional [11].
By conceptualizing intractability in such a way, the project’s aim was to support a transformation
towards both systemic and adaptive water governance. CADWAGO considered itself to be uniquely
placed to do this on account of having a set of partners who approached water governance from a
systemic perspective, from a perspective of socio-ecological resilience and adaptive capacity from a
deliberative perspective. Cognizant of this conceptualization, the problem context was introduced
in the original project application with an explicit recognition of water security as characterized by
resource (or water) dilemmas (Box 2) [33].
Box 2. Water Security in the CADWAGO project application.
Box 2. Water security, like many other global challenges, is characterized by complexity, uncertainty and high
decision stakes. Water resource issues are nested in complex systems that are dynamic and exhibit non-linear
properties, as demonstrated by the extremes of droughts and floods. Similarly, issues in water resource contexts
are often systemic, reflecting broader system contexts and complex interdependencies between the biophysical
and socio-economic domains. Interdependency compounds and moves problems between: upstream and
downstream, green and blue waters, sectors, gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, etc. Consequently, this is
a global challenge where there is often uncertainty over cause and effect. Moreover, this global challenge
also has high decision stakes, which relates to the potential catastrophic risk of climate change (combined
with other existing pressures) to water security with flow-on effects to other global challenges such as food
security, renewable energy and the provision of other essential ecosystem services. All of the above lead to
widely differing accounts of what can or should be done to improve the problem contexts. These contexts,
in which multiple stakeholders with different interests make competing claims over the same resources, lead
to controversy.
Flowing from this vantage point, CADWAGO aimed to examine the emerging issues underpinning
dilemmas associated with water security. These dilemmas were seen to lead to a conflict of interest
between “stakeholders” (those who hold different interests, i.e., stakes, in the issue) that magnify a
set of fundamental and often competing global challenges. CADWAGO implemented a comparative
case study analysis across a diverse set of country contexts (Europe, Australia, North America,
North Africa and Southeast Asia). This allowed for a transnational comparison of lessons pertaining
to the governance of water dilemmas, in a changing climate, with the aim of supporting governance
learning in Europe. After the first research iteration, the lessons from a synthesis of case study insights
suggested that a crucial element was missing in the original conceptualization of the project.
The norm critical gender researchers within the consortium first stirred the CADWAGO “pot” by
challenging CADWAGO’s original conceptualization of a water dilemma. Their findings suggested that
even if systemic, adaptive and deliberative processes were used to reconcile conflicting water interests,
emergent governance actions would ultimately be shaped by the agenda of those who had most agency
within water governance organizations [31]. This “agency landscape” could be attributed to the inherent
power differentials within these organizations, which in turn were given more or less traction by the
pre-existing norms and structures associated with water governance. Devoid of such consideration,
claims of systemic and adaptive governance being implemented would, at best, be cosmetic, imbibing
pale color into the prevailing status quo. At worst, it could be used by power-holders as a decoy to
strengthen their position and magnify prevailing inequities. This crucial finding led to the notion
that enabling water security requires more than being attentive to conflicts of interests between
stake-holders; it requires recognizing that different position-holders make competing claims, not over
divergences in interests but rather over who should have agency in the enactment of governance.
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Equipped with the above insights, CADWAGO’s conceptual framework was revised. In order to
communicate the governance status, the analysis of the project’s case study contexts was operationalized
in the idiom “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul” (RP3) (Table 1). The purpose of this idiom was to help unpack
the way water governance depends on both conflicts of interest and conflicts of positions. That is,
the idiom served as an analytical device to nuance the understanding of water conflicts, as one of the
approaches by which CADWAGO undertook its cross-case synthesis. Here case studies organized their
empirical insights under the RP3 storyline and thereafter the RP3 situation (governance status) was
explained by addressing the 3 key CADWAGO research themes (see themes in Table 1). This idiom also
served as a norm critical heuristic device to foster critical reflection in several stakeholder meetings
intended to support governance learning [34]. A multiplicity of conceptions of learning exist; we here
understood learning in line with the social learning tradition within research on water resources,
i.e., as a potential policy instrument to foster novel interaction between resource users to support
improved awareness of each other’s perspectives and, ultimately, reconstruction of such perspectives
with implication for action [35].
Table 1. The RP3S idiom.
Category Interest Dilemma Position Dilemma
Robbing (R): The water governance action/policy under scrutiny
Peter (P1):
The victims; those whose interests
are compromised
The disempowered; those whose agency is
being constrained
To pay (P2):
The entitlement; those harms/gains
emerging from complying to the
governance action, transferring material
value from one system of interest
to another
The claim; those discourses/framings that
determines—through institutionalization
and enactment—who has
legitimacy/authority to exert agency and
(re)construct the dilemma
Paul (P3):
The beneficiaries, those whose interests are
being served
The empowered; those who experience a gain
in agency
The origins of the RP3 idiom can be traced back to the period before the reformation and it
refers to the dilemma faced by the Catholic Church during the 16th century. As the church of St Paul
grew stronger in England it demanded taxes from its English constituency, the same taxes that were
previously paid to the church of St Peter in Rome. Hence the notion of RP3 and thus its use thereafter
as a verb in CADWAGO: “to take away from or cause harm to one person in order to pay or confer
something on another; to discharge one debt by incurring another” (Oxford dictionary). The harm
inflicted or debt incurred was for the purposes of the CADWAGO project interpreted to be either
linked to an interest in a material asset/condition or to claims as to who has agency in the enactment
of water governance (i.e., clarifying that water dilemmas must be viewed with attention to its qualities
as an interest dilemma as well as a position dilemma) (Table 1).
In order exemplify the utility of RP3 framework in fostering a systemic awareness of the
consequence of governance actions from both an interests and position perspective, we here share the
analysis from two of the case studies from the CADWAGO project, namely the implementation of two
European policy directives. In so doing, we also position the novel arguments of this paper in relation
to past research on water governance and resource conflicts.
3.1. Case 1: Gender and the EU Water Framework Directive
The enactment of environmental directives within the EU has historically grown from a notion
that the ideal state of any system can be identified and bounded by expert scientific knowledge.
In recognition of the multiple and conflicting interests associated with water governance, EU’s Water
Framework Directive (WFD) recognized that an ideal system state was negotiable and reflective of a
post-normal scientific tradition. Moreover, theWFD can be perceived as expression of the (instrumentalist)
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‘participatory turn’ within water governance, seeking to render governance actions more legitimate and
implementable [36]. Thus, the WFD stipulates that the chemical and ecological status of water shall
be defined by context-specific and stakeholder defined targets, thereby calling for the enactment of
participatory approaches in water governance, notably in the development and enactment of river
basin management plans (RBMP) [36].
As part of the CADWAGO project, Westberg and Powell [31] applied a gender theoretical lens in
order to contribute to research on why participatory approaches within environmental management
have had limited traction. Previous research has focused on the institutional misfit between hierarchical
organizations and participatory approaches [37,38] and the lack of competence amongst civil servants
with the task to facilitate participatory approaches [39–41] resulting in pseudo-involvement where
power relations has been left untouched and it has been business as usual [42]. At the same time,
research on both government and non-government organizations have revealed strong masculine
norms associated with top-down bureaucracy [43,44].
The study undertaken in CADWAGO has drawn upon interviews undertaken in five Swedish
County Administrative Boards (CABs), those organizations responsible for developing and
implementing RBMPs, with the aim of investigating who was given what tasks and why within
the organization. The findings showed that projects organized around participatory approaches were
mainly led by young and newly employed female officers. Furthermore, the interviews revealed
that the rationale for appointing these women as project leaders (PL’s) was related to their perceived
characteristics as women (being good at listening, being humble, good at coordinating and emphatic),
rather than their qualifications within the natural sciences. The choice of PL’s (new and young
employees), individuals with very limited agency within the organizational setting, also suggest
that the participatory projects were not prioritized within the CABs. The learning from the projects
was never shared within the organizations and nor did PL’s have the support required to enable
organizational learning. Thus, the projects promoting the participation of stakeholders in the RBMP
processes became decoupled from the “normal” activities undertaken by the CAB’s.
The Gender and WFD case suggests that participatory approaches have a lower status than
normal scientific approaches. This has led to the reproduction of prevailing inequities within CABs,
whereby the pre-existing power-holders, most often men, have retained the agency in terms of enacting
high-level policy actions, such RBMP (see Table 2). The analysis, enabled by the RP3 idiom, helps shed
light on both the interest and position dilemma underlying the water governance. In so doing,
it complements structural theories that ascribe inertia and implementation failure to path-dependencies
and institutional misfit [45]. By attending to the position dilemma in particular, the framework opens
for an appreciation of dynamics of everyday practices, performances and agency which otherwise may
be overlooked [30].
Table 2. Application of the RP3 idiom to the Water Framework Directive case.
Category Interest Dilemma Position Dilemma
Robbing (R): Water Framework Directive implementation
Peter (P1):
Those stakeholders at risk of reduced access
to good quality water resources on account of
participatory planning processes in the river
basin (i.e., those with high interest in
changing the status quo)
Female civil servants in the authorities
involved in WFD implementation,
specifically facilitation of
stakeholder collaboration
To pay (P2)
The access to water resources (incl. quality
and quantity) in situations of increased
climate risks
WFD implementation is shaped by and,
in turn, exacerbates gendered ‘inequality
regimes’ within government authorities.
Paul (P3):
Those stakeholders benefiting from
maintaining or reproducing the status quo.
Male civil servants in the authorities
involved in WFD implementation
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3.2. Case 2: EU’s Renewable Energy Directive and North South Inequities
In this second case, we shall consider the European biofuels market and its demand for vegetable
oil contributing to the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia, the world’s largest
producer [46]. These developments have been partly driven by the incentives created through the
EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (EU-RED). From the outset, the EU-RED set a target that 10% of the
energy used in the transport sector across the EU should be generated from renewable sources by 2020.
Member states generally chose to prioritize liquid biofuels, which are thought to represent the most
cost-competitive option in the short term. To be eligible for government support or to count towards
mandatory national renewable energy targets, biofuels used in the EU—whether produced locally or
imported—must comply with the so-called sustainability criteria set out in articles 17, 18 and 19 of
the EU-RED. The sustainability criteria, which has been in effect since December 2010, stipulated a
minimum level of direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emission savings (35% in 2009, rising to 50% in 2017)
and imposed restrictions on cultivating land with high biodiversity and high carbon stocks (such as
peatland and wetlands). The criteria prohibited conversion of such areas from the baseline date of
January 2008 (Art. 17).
The mode of implementation was—just as in the WFD—partly supposedly participatory, aimed at
addressing interest dilemmas: National authorities, companies and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) were encouraged to implement voluntary biofuel sustainability certification schemes and
the Commission indicated which criteria these schemes must meet in order to achieve EU-wide
recognition. Moreover, several of these certification schemes espouse, themselves, participatory
ambitions, involving stakeholders in production countries such as Indonesia in the negotiation and
implementation of their sustainability standard. One case in point is the Roundtable for Sustainable
Palm Oil (RSPO), the leading voluntary sustainability standard for palm oil products (in terms of total
market coverage for food and fuel) [47].
The work in CADWAGO was carried out in an action research process covering one and a half
years of collaboration between an international research institute, a national Indonesian human rights
NGO and a local environmental NGO with a permanent presence in the field sites [29]. The primary
methodology comprised of interviews and focus groups in villages of in Central Kalimantan, Indonesian
Borneo, in Sampit, the district capital of Kotawaringin Timur; in Palangkaraya, the capital of Central
Kalimantan Province; and in Jakarta.
The study documented how this governance action provoked an “exporting” of water dilemmas
to Indonesian oil palm contexts, wherein the ambitions of stakeholder participation to reconcile interest
dilemmas was defeated, largely due to an inability to address position dilemmas (see Table 3). First and
foremost, the governance action did not address the legacy of a poorly performing institutional
environment, including a weakness as concerns traceability in the supply chains, accountability of
core companies and due diligence requirements [48]. Second, the “sustainability criteria” in the EU-RED
encompassed only land use changes (connected to concerns with GHG emissions) while altogether
disregardingwater resource exploitation in the actual process of cultivation and production and excluding
socio-economic criteria regarding impacts on local livelihoods. This disregard for water-related
ecosystem services derived from Borneo’s peatland forests served as a reflection on the “water blindness”
that characterizes the current international debate on biofuel feedstock production [49].
More importantly and this is where the main contribution from the proposed framework lies,
the analysis shows how this implementation failure can be attributed to lack of cognizance of the
underlying position dilemma (Table 3). The implementation of the EU-RED allowed the energy and
climate sectors to appropriate mandate and resources to stimulate market demand without attending
to policy coherence with the EU’s development and water objectives. It has allowed energy security
priorities of affluent nations to put local livelihoods in peril and benefit already privileged market
actors [50]. As a consequence, the EU’s renewable energy policy was developed under the auspices of
climate change but ended up ignoring underlying position dilemmas that benefit already privileged
power holders while reproducing inequities in Indonesia. The framework creates a meeting place
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betweenwater governance research that tends to be blind to position dilemmas and critical perspectives
from inter alia political ecology on discursive strategies, power and agency, that nonetheless tend to
pay limited attention to conflicts in the context of water resources e.g., [51].
Table 3. Application of the RP3 idiom to the Renewable Energy Directive Case.
Category Interest Dilemma Position Dilemma
Robbing (R): EU’s renewable energy policy, intended to reduce GHG emissions
Peter (P1):
Local communities, Indonesian
government and its public agencies.
The informal “guardians” of Indonesian local
communities, e.g., social CSOs and human
rights advocates.
To pay (P2):
The EU demand increases palm oil
imports more than 6-fold and stimulate
expansion of plantations, resulting in
water pollution in Indonesia.
The climate change discourse and EU-RED
frames the issue to be solvable by positivist
natural science and market actors while
disqualifying norms about rights and
responsibilities as irrelevant to the
governance situation.
Paul (P3):
EU member states, European
biofuel companies.
Financial market actors, corporate
lobby groups.
3.3. Summary Reflections on the Case Studies
The two case studies have shown how understanding stakeholding in the context of water
governance requires more than being attentive to conflicts of interests between stakeholders; it also
requires recognizing that there are competing claims over whom should have agency in the enactment
of governance that determines the system state. A stakeholder, who holds a position or capability
to transform the resource or situation at stake, can be referred to as a position-holder. Equally well,
a stakeholder’s interest in a situation or resource can solely be driven by a quest for agency; independent
of any material or biophysical stake. The endowed agency of position-holders can magnify the
wickedness of these types of situations on account of a potential decoupling between the power
to transform and the inherent stakes. It is the position-holders who define the limits of the context or
risk and thereby determine who is being rational in the process.
In the CADWAGO cases presented in this paper, the position-holder’s rationality was legitimized
by the presence of a particular epistemic culture that has perpetuated a misfit, which tends to exclude
deliberate policy considerations, non-measurable concepts or moral dimensions such as fairness,
equity and rightness [52]. This in turn tends to lead to a reproduction of a maladapted status quo
(business as usual), which can be proactively orchestrated by position-holders as a means to retain
high levels of agency.
4. Conclusions
There is a logical convergence between the water and climate change discourses owing to the
intrinsic biophysical links between climate and the water cycles. The convergence of these discourses
makes the neo-Malthusian reasoning compelling; as a crystal ball, whose clairvoyance foresees the
role that anthropogenic climate change will play in amplifying preexisting water scarcity. In so doing,
it is assumed that conflicts of interest will be exacerbated to a point where violent conflict is an
inevitable outcome.
Whilst we acknowledge the worthiness of specially designed actions and universal agreements
to curb global warming and its associated threats, we also recognize that there are significant risks
associated with orchestrating such a substantial transformation conditioned by a securitized political
context. Notably, the post normal positioning of a securitized climate change discourse, combined with
the forthcoming unleashing of an expected torrent of actions post COP21 (e.g., so-called green financing
to multi-nationals and large infrastructure projects), are no longer directly accountable to or centered
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on the moral authority defined by otherwise accepted societal norms (e.g., water rights of locally
affected populations). It will then, in all likelihood, exacerbate pre-existing societal inequities.
Indeed, to some extent, the security narrative (as articulated in the international community)
and the equity narrative (as articulated by the CADWAGO project) share the view that traditional
governance approaches are dysfunctional under post normal conditions; yet they go on to very
different conclusions. While the security narrative motivates so-called “extraordinary” actions of
already privileged power-holders the equity narrative advocates a more deliberative and inclusive
invitation to stakeholders otherwise ignored in the negotiations over water. By means of the RP3
heuristic we saw how a focus on stake-holders or position-holders results in very different conclusions
regarding governance responses, helping to nuance the singular focus on (neo-Malthusian) material
interests and the extraordinary responses that may be evoked on this basis.
In the literature, it is commonly assumed that post-normal spaces offer promises of more desirable
and innovative governance constellations and or climate adaptation actions [52–56]. Building on
such claims, the water security discourse and its underlying scientific narratives on various types
of leadership in the Anthropocene go on to suggest the need for a “[f]undamental reorientation and
restructuring of national and international institutions” (Biermann [57] citing the 2012 State of the
Planet Declaration). While we support such arguments, in principle, we have in this paper offered a
more critical reading of the risks s associatedwith “extraordinary” responses driven by the securitization
narrative and the importance of reorienting the discursive terrain to equity concerns instead.
Nations and power-holders have had an interest in appropriating and reframing governance
situations based on the securitized explanations to promote their own interests, often by co-opting the
myopic international community. By applying this reasoning to the case of COP21, it could be argued
that power-holders—through reifying climate change as a threat to global order and sidelining the
interest and position dilemmas that underlie security—have managed to both co-opt the international
community and hoodwink the general public in a single sweep. As reviewed above, this concerns a
particular post-normal governmentality founded on a human security paradigm that attributes conflict
to changes in environmental degradation and bio-physical variables rather than the institutional
structures that are maintained to reproduce inequities and which are frequently the real roots of
conflict [23,58]. Governmentality here refers to the orchestration of practices (in this case the rationalities
espoused by the security discourse) by which global citizens are governed [59].
By drawing on findings from the CADWAGO project we have argued that most water governance
narrative processes are defined and mediated by a security narrative; an interest centered narrative
that is devoid of equity considerations and explicit acknowledgment of the real issues that mediate
the underlying power brokering processes. The governance actions emerging from this securitized
discourse will tend to reproduce pre-existing norms and structures, amplify inequities and thereby
nurture truly fertile ground for the exacerbation of controversy. We argue that by actively facilitating
the reframing of water issues from a security narrative to an equity narrative, for instance via enacting
a RP3 lens, both interests (bio-physical material stakes) and positions (space for human agency) will
be deliberated upon. In so doing, different constellations of stakeholders, who operate outside the
pre-existing structures, will become visible and ultimately may be empowered in the process.
We contend that adopting an equity narrative could pave the way for water governance
transformations that lead to new modes of climate change adaptation that support the real victims of
climate change. It would embody a shift from the one dimensional political voices in standardized
transnational/national negotiations, which tend to reflect perspectives that accord with the norms
of the pre-existing power holders. Instead, it would pay attention to the multiplicity of voices and
perspectives manifest at subnational levels—those who understand the complexities that underpin the
conflicts that they experience.
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